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Introduction
Prospective Memory
Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to 
carry out planned actions at the appropriate point in the 
future (McDaniel and Einstein 2007). Everyday examples 
of PM tasks include remembering to stop at the supermar-
ket to buy milk on the way home from work, remember-
ing to call somebody on their birthday, or remembering to 
turn off the bath taps before the bath overflows. McDaniel 
and Einstein (2007) have outlined the core characteristics 
of a PM task as follows. First, there must be a consciously 
formed intention or plan that should be carried out in the 
future. That is, there should be a delay between formation 
of an intention to act and the execution of that intention; 
if there was no delay, then the task would be more akin to 
a vigilance/monitoring task than a PM task, because the 
intention can be held in short-term/working memory for the 
entire period between formation and execution (Graf and 
Uttl 2001). Second, the PM task has to be embedded in an 
ongoing activity that requires attentional resources. Thus, a 
person needs to consciously interrupt the ongoing task to 
perform their intended action for the task to be considered 
a measure of PM.
In experimental studies, researchers commonly distin-
guish between event-based and time-based PM (Einstein 
and McDaniel 1990). Event-based PM involves carrying 
out an intention upon the occurrence of a particular event 
(e.g., taking the cake out of the oven when the timer goes 
off; taking medication after breakfast). Time-based PM 
involves carrying out an intention at a particular future 
time point (e.g., call somebody at 3  p.m.; take medica-
tion at 1 p.m.). In experimental measures of PM (time- or 
event-based), an ongoing task/activity might be a lexical 
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decision task (e.g., deciding whether items that appear on-
screen are words or nonwords). In an event-based task with 
this ongoing activity, the PM instruction might be to “press 
the space bar when the item ‘Dog’ appears on-screen”. In 
this example, the appearance of the word “Dog” represents 
the event that should be responded to in accordance with 
the PM instruction. In a time-based task with this ongo-
ing activity, the PM instruction might be to “press the 
space bar at exactly 2 min intervals throughout the task”. 
Additionally, in time-based PM tasks, participants need to 
monitor time during the task in order to carry out the PM 
instruction. Usually, in computer-based tasks, participants 
can press a pre-specified keyboard key to display a clock, 
which remains on screen for a short period. For both event- 
and time-based PM tasks, performance is usually measured 
by: (a) the proportion of correct responses in the ongoing 
task (e.g., the proportion of items correctly classified as 
words/nonwords in the lexical decision task; ongoing task 
performance/accuracy), and (b) the proportion of PM fail-
ures (the proportion of occasions that participants did not 
carry out the PM instruction when they should have; PM 
task performance/accuracy). Additionally, the frequency 
(total number) and distribution of clock checks is another 
measure that is usually taken in time-based PM tasks. An 
adaptive time-monitoring strategy would mean that a par-
ticipant only makes a few clock checks at the beginning of 
the task establishing a feel for the passage of time (e.g., five 
checks within the first minute of the task), but increasingly 
checks the clock more frequently closer to target time (e.g., 
five checks within the last 20 s before the target time) (e.g., 
Mäntylä et al. 2007).
Evidence for the distinction between time-based and 
event-based PM comes from (a) neuroimaging and lesion 
studies, which report that distinct sub-regions of the rostral 
prefrontal cortex underpin time-based vs. event-based PM 
(Burgess et al. 2011) and that lesions to specific regions of 
the rostral prefrontal cortex impair one aspect of PM, but 
not the other (e.g., Volle et al. 2011); (b) studies of devel-
opment, which reveal different patterns of age-related 
improvement (in children) and decline (in older adults) in 
event-based vs. time-based PM (Henry et al. 2004; Kliegel 
et al. 2013); and (c) neuropsychology studies that indicate 
possible double-dissociations between these two types of 
PM (Altgassen et al. 2014; Katai et  al. 2003). One of the 
crucial differences between event-based and time-based 
PM is the retrieval context. In event-based tasks, the occur-
rence of the target event can automatically activate retrieval 
of one’s intention (cued retrieval of one’s intention provid-
ing one registers/perceives the event). In contrast, time-
based PM tasks do not have any specific event that one 
needs to respond to and, thus, retrieval of one’s intention 
must be self-initiated, which places a high demand on exec-
utive functioning.
Neurocognitive Underpinnings of Prospective Memory
PM requires the complex interplay of several cognitive pro-
cesses, including aspects of executive functioning (Martin 
et al. 2003). Planning is involved during the formation and 
encoding of an intention (Kliegel et  al. 2002), and retro-
spective/working memory is necessary to store the delayed 
intention while performing the ongoing task or filler tasks 
(Marsh and Hicks 1998). At the same time, attentional 
monitoring of the environment is required to recognise 
the appropriate moment to initiate the PM action (Kliegel 
et al. 2008). Finally, in order to successfully execute one’s 
intention, a person has to shift their attention away from 
the ongoing task, which requires cognitive flexibility and 
inhibitory control (Kliegel et al. 2002).
Another cognitive process which is thought to play a key 
role in PM is episodic future thinking (the ability to project 
oneself mentally into the future to imagine/pre-experience 
future events/states of self; Atance and O’Neill 2001). 
Specifically, episodic future thinking is thought to play an 
important role during intention formation in terms of cue-
to-retrieval-context association (Brewer et  al. 2011). That 
is, episodic future thinking might support PM retrieval by 
strengthening the association between PM cues and the 
future context that they will appear in. For example, at the 
stage of encoding one’s intention to visit the supermarket 
on the way home from work, one might imagine taking 
the turn at the traffic light to go the supermarket instead 
of heading straight home. Later, when actually at the traf-
fic light, the similarity between the environment and one’s 
earlier episodic simulation may help trigger the activation 
of the PM action (Altgassen et al. 2015). Finally, PM may 
well depend to some extent on mentalising ability. Specifi-
cally, the ability to represent one’s own intentions would 
seem to be imperative for successful PM (e.g., Altgassen 
et al. 2014).
Autism Spectrum Disorder
One neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterised by 
impairments of several of the aforementioned neurocog-
nitive underpinnings of PM is autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD). ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder that is diag-
nosed on the basis of impairments in social-communica-
tion, and a restricted, repetitive repertoire of behaviour and 
interests (DSM 5, American Psychiatric Association 2013; 
ICD-10, World Health Organisation 2006). At the cognitive 
level, ASD is characterised by impairments in mentalis-
ing/Theory of Mind (e.g., Happé and Frith 1995), episodic 
memory and future thinking (e.g., Lind et al. 2014), as well 
as task switching (cognitive flexibility) and planning (e.g., 
Williams and Jarrold 2013), and visual working memory 
(e.g., Kenworthy et al. 2008). Because these neurocognitive 
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abilities are impaired in ASD and an inherent component 
of PM, it would clearly follow that at least some aspects of 
PM should be impaired in ASD.
If individuals with ASD are indeed impaired in either 
or both event-based and time-based PM, this would 
likely have serious ramifications for every-day function-
ing. Impairments in PM, which are a common feature of 
normal aging (e.g., Maylor et  al. 2002), can drastically 
reduce an individual’s ability to live independently and 
maintain many activities that are often taken for granted 
(Mateer et al. 1996; Terry 1988). At the extreme end of 
possible consequences, impaired PM could lead one to 
forget to take medication or to take food off the stove, 
which might have disastrous consequences. Less dramati-
cally, an impairment in PM would seriously hinder oppor-
tunity to maintain employment (Howlin and Moss 2012). 
Moreover, there are even potentially negative social con-
sequences of a PM impairment. For example, forgetting 
to call a friend on his birthday, or to attend a funeral, 
could have a significant impact on social relations, which 
are already difficult for people with ASD. Therefore, it 
is crucial to investigate PM in ASD as PM deficits could 
contribute to social and behavioural impairments in ASD.
In this article, we took two approaches to explore PM 
research in ASD. In Part 1, we will report the results of a 
meta-analysis that was conducted with the aim of estab-
lishing whether or not/the extent to which PM is impaired 
in ASD. An initial interpretation of the meta-analytic sta-
tistics is offered in Part 1. However, as discussed at length 
below, the results from a meta-analysis need to be inter-
preted carefully in light of several methodological issues 
with some of the studies included. Therefore, in Part  2, 
we provide a detailed critical reflection on the research 
included in the meta-analysis, which provides the back-
ground for further reflection on the analysis in Part 1.
Fig. 1  Flow-chart depicting literature search process
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Part 1: Meta-analysis of Studies of PM in ASD
Methods
Sample of Studies
A literature search (see Fig.  1) was conducted on Web of 
Science using the search terms “autism” AND “prospective 
memory” for articles published prior to May 2016 resulting 
in 37 articles. Of these, 13 studies with an ASD sample were 
excluded as they studied something other than PM. Five lit-
erature reviews were excluded that did not provide any data 
of their own (two of which briefly mentioned PM in ASD, 
two were on PM in general, and one was unrelated to PM). 
Another four studies were excluded as they studied PM in 
a population other than ASD. Finally, three studies were 
excluded as they were completely unrelated to ASD and PM. 
Hence, we identified 12 studies that had investigated PM in 
ASD and included these in the meta-analysis. No further 
studies were identified from reference lists of other included 
studies or by replicating our search using additional search 
engines (Pubmed, Google Scholar). Tables  1 and 2 sum-
marise the included studies and give a brief overview of the 
experimental approach/protocols of each study. Figure  2 
depicts the mean age for both ASD and the neurotypical 
(NT) control group, together with the overall age range and 
the verbal mental age of each experimental group.
Meta‑analytic Procedure
Meta-analytic statistics were calculated following the 
guidelines of Lipsey and Wilson (2001), separately for 
time-based PM and event-based PM studies. Effect sizes 
were calculated for the difference in prospective memory 
performance between ASD and NT participants. The effect 
size estimate was the bias-corrected standardised mean dif-
ference (Hedges’g), which corrects an overestimation bias 
of effect sizes in small-scale studies (Hedges 1981; Hedges 
and Olkin 1985). In the meta-analysis, a fixed-effects model 
was used to calculate the mean effect, expressing group dif-
ferences in PM, weighted for sample size, and a 95% con-
fidence interval (CI) was calculated based on its standard 
error (SE). The direction of the effect size was negative if 
performance of the ASD group was worse than the control 
group and effect sizes were classified according to Cohen’s 
(1988) criteria (0.20 is “small”, 0.50 is “medium”, and 0.80 
is “large”). A z-test for the overall effect was conducted 
to test the significance of the mean weighted effect  and a 
homogeneity analysis was conducted to test for homogene-
ity of the effect size distribution. A significant homogene-
ity parameter indicates that the variability of the included 
effect sizes is greater than to be expected from sampling 
error and suggests that other explanatory variables should 
be investigated. In this case, a conservative approach was 
adopted and an additional effect size estimate was calcu-
lated using the random-effects model.
Multiple Effect Sizes from Single Studies
To satisfy the independence assumption of meta-analyses 
when calculating the mean weighted effect for time- and 
event-based PM, respectively, each participant could con-
tribute to only one group contrast for statistical analytic 
purposes. Therefore, it was not possible to include all cal-
culable effect sizes in three of the included studies, because 
doing so would have violated the assumption of independ-
ence in one of the following ways: (a) multiple ASD groups 
but only one NT group would have meant that the NT 
group would be included in the meta-analysis more than 
once if all reported group contrasts were included (Shep-
pard et al. 2016); (b) multiple NT groups but only one ASD 
group would have meant that the ASD group would be 
included more than once if all reported group contrasts 
were included (Yi et al. 2014); or (c) multiple PM measures 
from the same participants would mean that each partici-
pant would be included more than once if performance on 
all measures was included (Altgassen et al. 2012). Further-
more, to avoid biasing the mean weighted effect, group 
contrasts that explored the effect of attempts to improve 
PM in the ASD were excluded (Kretschmer et  al. 2014). 
Full details of the procedure for deciding which effect size 
should be included in the meta-analysis are reported.1
1 In four studies, a decision had to be made about which of the mul-
tiple effect sizes reported should be included in the meta-analysis. 
Our decisions were based entirely on the rationale for the study and/
or study hypotheses, and not on study results. Importantly, taking 
alternative decisions would not have changed the results of the meta-
analysis substantively. Moreover, for completeness, the effect sizes 
that were not included in the meta-analysis are displayed in the forest 
plots (Figs. 2, 3). In Sheppard et al. (2016), who tested a mildly and 
severely autistic group of children, the effect size from the group con-
trast between the severely autistic vs. neurotypical children was used 
in line with Sheppard et  al.‘s (2016) hypothesis that only severely 
autistic children would show a PM impairment. In Yi et  al. (2014), 
who included two comparison groups (one matched for chronological 
age with the ASD group, and one matched for mental age with the 
ASD group) in their study, the contrast between ASD and the ability-
matched NT group was used as the age-matched NT group performed 
at absolute ceiling on the PM task making valid comparison with the 
ASD group impossible. For Altgassen et al. (2012) who used a stand-
ard measure of PM in addition to a naturalistic PM task, the standard-
ised mean differences for the two contrasts (which were very similar) 
were averaged into a composite effect size. Finally, Kretschmer et al. 
(2014) manipulated a between-subject factor that aimed to improve 
PM using an encoding strategy in comparison to a standard no strat-
egy condition. As this meta-analysis aimed to estimate the extent of 
true PM impairment in ASD, inclusion of the strategy contrast in the 
analysis would bias the weighted effect size. Hence, we used the con-
trast where participants performed the PM task under the no-strategy 
condition.
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Results
For time-based PM, a total of 118 participants with ASD 
and 118 NT control participants from six studies were 
included using a fixed-effects model. The weighted effect 
for the between-group difference in performance was −0.87 
(SE 0.14, 95% CI −1.14 to −0.60; z = 6.38, p < .001). The 
homogeneity test was non-significant (Q = 1.22, p = .94) 
indicating that the variance across the included effect sizes 
was not greater than expected by sampling error. These 
findings indicate a large and consistent impairment of time-
based PM in ASD across studies (see Fig. 3).
For event-based PM, a total of 311 participants with 
ASD and 287 NT control participants from 11 studies were 
included in the fixed-effects model. The weighted effect for 
the between-group difference in performance was −0.41 
(SE 0.08, 95% CI −0.57 to −0.24; z = 4.83, p < .001). How-
ever, the test for homogeneity of effect sizes was highly 
significant (Q = 25.14, p = .005), which suggests that the 
variance among the included effect sizes was greater than 
expected by sampling error. Subsequently, the data was 
re-entered into a random-effects model that includes ran-
dom effects variance (due to random differences between 
studies) in the weighting of the individual effect sizes in the 
model. This revealed a significant weighted effect of −0.43 
(SE 0.13, 95% CI −0.69 to −0.17; z = 3.20, p < .01). Hence, 
both models indicate a small impairment of event-based 
PM in ASD, although the underlying effect sizes are het-
erogeneous across studies (see Fig. 4).
Although the results of the meta-analysis provide some 
indication of a relatively minor impairment in event-based 
PM in ASD, this stands in stark contrast to the clear and 
strong effect of a time-based PM impairment in individu-
als with this condition. Some caution might be taken when 
interpreting the findings with regard to event-based PM, 
however. Although results from the random effects model 
suggest that a significant weighted effect for event-based 
PM overall cannot be solely due to significant heterogene-
ity of effect-sizes across studies, the existence of such het-
erogeneity is nonetheless important to consider. Indeed, in 
Part 2, we provide a detailed critical analysis of the stud-
ies included in the meta-analysis and conclude that the 
Table 1  Overview of characteristics of time-based prospective memory studies in autism spectrum disorder
n.s. not specified
*Time- and event-based PM task within the same condition
**Time- and event-based PM task in separate conditions
a Effect sizes represent the standardised bias-corrected mean difference Hedges’g (calculation according to Lipsey and Wilson 2001)




in ASD group 
(Hedges’g)a
Sample size (male 
per group)
Mean age per 
group (range)
Ongoing task # of PM trials
Altgassen et al. 
(2009)
nASD = 11 (n.s.)





5 trials Yes, ~10 min Yes (g = −0.91)
Altgassen et al. 
(2012)*
nASD = 25 (20 
male)





2 trials Yes , ~15 min Yes (g = −0.94)
Williams et al. 
(2013)**
nASD = 21 (20 
male)







6 trials No Yes (g = −0.66)
Williams et al. 
(2014)**
nASD = 17 (14 
male)







5 trials No Yes (g = −0.66)
Henry et al. 
(2014)*
nASD = 30 (24 
male)






(high vs. low 
task absorption)
12 trials across 3 
virtual days, (2 
regular/2 irregu-
lar per virtual 
day)
No Yes (g = −1.02)
Kretschmer et al. 
(2014)*
nASD = 27 (9 male)










12 trials across 3 
virtual days, (2 
regular/2 irregu-
lar per virtual 
day)
No Yes (g = −1.01)
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meta-analytic findings of a small impairment in event-
based PM derive in large part from methodological issues 
in some of the studies, which might render conclusions 
from the meta-analysis alone unreliable if they are not con-
sidered in context.
Part 2: Critical Analysis of Studies of PM in ASD
Methodological and Conceptual Issues in the Study 
of Prospective Memory in ASD
In order to interpret the results of case-control studies of 
PM ability with confidence several issues should be consid-
ered. Table 3 presents an overview of all studies included in 
the meta-analysis, as well as an indication of whether any 
of the potential methodological problems described below 
apply to them.
Group Matching Procedure
In case-control studies, experimental groups need to 
be carefully matched for baseline characteristics that 
are likely to relate to the dependent variable. Evidence 
suggests that PM has a clear developmental trajectory 
(Kliegel et al. 2008), and that both verbal (Uttl 2006; Uttl 
et  al. 2013) and nonverbal (Cockburn and Smith 1991; 
Maylor 1996) intelligence are related to it. Furthermore, 
there is some evidence for a female advantage in PM 
tasks (Palermo et  al. 2015). Therefore, when studying 
PM in ASD, it is important for groups to be matched for 
verbal and nonverbal ability (mental age), as well as for 
chronological age and gender (between-group differences 
should only be small in size—Cohen’s d < 0.50; McCa-
rtney et  al. 2006). Failure to match groups for baseline 
characteristics can result in type I errors, because group 
differences in PM may result from group differences in 
the baseline characteristics of groups, rather than from 
diagnostic status (Mervis and Klein-Tasman 2004).
Ongoing Task Performance
A typical PM task is always embedded into an ongo-
ing task. Thus, similar to a dual-task design, attentional 
and cognitive resources are divided between the com-
pletion of the ongoing task and completion of the PM 
action/intention. It is important that groups are matched 
for ongoing task performance. Otherwise, analyses of 
between-group differences in PM performance may be 
“contaminated” by the effects of between-group dif-
ferences in ongoing task performance. For example, if 
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the control group(s) on the ongoing task, then poorer 
PM task performance in the ASD group could merely 
reflect the fact that ASD participants had fewer cognitive 
resources than control participants to devote to the PM 
task as a result of their difficulty with the ongoing task. 
Alternatively, if the ASD group performs significantly 
less well than the control group(s) on the ongoing task, 
but equivalently to the control group on the PM task, this 
may reflect differential allocation of cognitive resources 
performance in the ASD group (i.e., PM performance is 
being scaffolded/prioritised at the expense of ongoing 
task performance).
Retrospective Memory for the PM Instruction
PM requires an individual to encode and store an intention 
to act in the future, which relies on retrospective memory. 
While it is clear that retrospective and prospective memory 
are related, factor analytic studies (among other types of 
study) show that they are clearly distinguishable (Craw-
ford et  al. 2003; Maylor et  al. 2002). PM failure could 
result either from a failure of the specific mechanisms that 
underpin prospective memory retrieval, or from a failure of 
retrospective memory (i.e., when the intention is not even 
encoded/stored properly). Given well-established difficul-
ties with spontaneous, episodic recall in ASD (Boucher 
et al. 2012), it may be that people with this disorder have 
PM impairments purely as a result of retrospective memory 
difficulties. This would be important to know, of course, 
and would have implications for the management of PM 
difficulties in ASD. However, most studies have the aim 
of discovering whether the mechanisms that specifically 
underpin PM retrieval are impaired in ASD (i.e., whether 
PM is impaired over and above retrospective memory). 
To achieve this aim, it is necessary to assess retrospective 
memory for the PM instruction/action immediately after 
completion of the experimental PM task. If a participant 
cannot recall the PM action even after prompting, it shows 
that PM failure is a consequence of retrospective memory 
difficulties only. Hence, studies should exclude those par-
ticipants who, after prompting, cannot remember the PM 
instruction/action.
Fig. 2  Depiction of the mean age (middle marker) and the minimum 
and maximum age range for each experimental group for all studies 
investigating prospective memory in ASD. Where possible we plot-
ted the verbal mental age of each group onto the age distribution as 
marked with the grey x to illustrate the relation of chronological vs. 
mental age in each study. TB time-based PM only study, EB event-
based PM only study, TB and EB time-based and event-based PM 
study, *Jones et  al. (2011) did not study event-based PM per se but 
investigated everyday memory in ASD
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Mixed PM Experiments
Some studies of PM use paradigms that test both time- and 
event-based PM within the same condition. Although this 
may be more representative of real-life PM demands, the 
approach suffers from difficulties that limit interpretation 
of results. Specifically, if individuals with ASD have reli-
able impairments in only one aspect of PM, then difficulties 
with this aspect would leave fewer cognitive resources than 
would otherwise be the case for the usually-undiminished 
aspect. Thus, the recommended approach is to investigate 
time- and event-based PM in separate experiments (or 
experimental conditions of a task) within the same sample.
Having considered these potential methodological 
issues, we now discuss four landmark studies that serve as 
a foundation for considering other studies of PM in ASD. 
Then, we examine further laboratory studies, as well as 
studies that explored PM in ASD in a more naturalistic 
context.
Landmark Studies of PM in ASD
In the first study of event‑based PM in ASD, Altgassen, 
Schmitz-Hübsch, and Kliegel (2010) compared 19 chil-
dren/adolescents with ASD to 19 age- and ability-matched 
NT peers. The ongoing task tapped visuospatial working 
memory. In a study phase of this task, participants viewed 
a number of geometric shapes, and had to encode and store 
the configuration of shapes. After a short delay, a second 
set of geometric shapes appeared on the screen and partici-
pants had to decide whether the shape configuration was 
same or different to the first one (recognition phase). The 
background colour on which the shapes were presented 
changed randomly after each trial. For the PM component, 
participants were instructed to press a pre-specified key-
board key whenever they noticed a change in background 
colour to yellow. Participants performed the ongoing task 
Fig. 3  Forest plot for effect sizes and 95% confidence interval for 
time-based PM studies as well as the mean weighted effect and its 
95% confidence interval (in grey, diamond marker). Vertical grey 
line marks the weighted mean effect. Studies marked with an asterisk 
were not included in the meta-analysis
Fig. 4  Forest plot for effect 
sizes and 95% confidence inter-
val for event-based PM studies 
as well as the mean weighted 
effect and its 95% confidence 
interval for both fixed- and 
random-effects models (in grey, 
diamond marker). Vertical grey 
line marks the weighted mean 
effect of the random-effects 
model. Studies marked with an 
asterisk were not included in the 
meta-analysis
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alone for 10 trials (single-task block), followed by the 
PM condition (dual-task block). The results revealed no 
between-group differences in ongoing or PM task perfor-
mance. The authors concluded that event-based PM, which 
depends on cued retrieval, is unimpaired in ASD.
Altgassen and colleagues were also the first to investi-
gate time‑based PM performance in individuals with ASD. 
Altgassen et al. (2009) assessed 11 children/teenagers with 
ASD and 11 age- and ability-matched NT control partici-
pants. The ongoing task required participants to perform a 
visuospatial working memory task similar to the one used 
by Altgassen et  al. (2010). In the PM condition, partici-
pants were instructed to press a pre-specified keyboard key 
at 2-min intervals throughout the ongoing task. During this 
condition, participants could, at any time, bring up an on-
screen clock that displayed the time elapsed by pressing a 
specified key. Importantly, the ongoing task was carried out 
twice - once as single-task block (ongoing-only condition), 
and once as dual-task block together with the PM instruc-
tion (PM condition). The ASD group performed signifi-
cantly worse in the ongoing task during the PM condition, 
but not in the ongoing-only condition. More importantly, 
the results revealed significantly better PM performance, as 
well as a more adaptive time-monitoring curve, in NT chil-
dren. Therefore, the authors concluded that the diminished 
PM performance in ASD might originate from difficulties 
with self-initiated processing, as reflected by a less-than-
optimal pattern of time monitoring.
Despite some methodological concerns regarding Alt-
gassen et al.’s (2009) study (see Williams et al. 2013), the 
conclusions drawn both from this study (that time-based 
PM is impaired in ASD) and the study by Altgassen et al. 
(2010) (that event-based PM is unimpaired in ASD) are 
supported by the results from two studies by Williams 
et  al. (2013, 2014). Williams et  al. (2013) examined 
both time-based and event-based PM in a sample of 21 
children with ASD and 21 NT children matched on age, 
and IQ. Time-based vs. event-based PM were assessed 
separately as two within-subject conditions carried out 
within the context of a computer-based driving game (the 
ongoing task). The ongoing task required participants to 
collect tokens and avoid obstacles while driving down a 
road. For the time-based PM task, participants were told 
that their car had only a limited amount of fuel, which 
would run out after 80 s unless they remembered to refuel 
it. The fuel level could be monitored at any time by press-
ing a particular keyboard key, which caused a fuel gauge 
to be displayed on screen temporarily. Importantly refuel-
ling was only possible after the fuel level dropped to a 
critical level (between 60 and 80 s). For the event-based 
PM task participants had to press a specific keyboard key 
whenever they passed a truck. Results revealed a sig-
nificant Group (ASD/control) × Condition (event-based/
Table 3  Overview of included studies with regard to key methodological issues
VA verbal ability, NVA nonverbal ability, VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full scale IQ, R reading national curriculum point score, W 
writing national curriculum point score, N number national curriculum point score, NA not applicable











Altgassen et al. (2009) Yes Age 0.36 VA 0.50 NVA 0.30 No 1.19 Not reported No
Altgassen et al. (2010) Partly Age 0.01 VA 0.58 NVA 0.25 Yes 0.09 Not reported No
Brandimonte et al. (2011) Partly Age 0.04 FSIQ 0.29 – No 0.55 Yes No
Jones et al. (2011) Yes Age 0.0 VIQ 0.25 PIQ 0.04 NA – Yes No
Altgassen et al. (2012) Yes Age 0.0 VA 0.44 NVA 0.15 No 1.60 Not reported Yes
Williams et al. (2013) Yes Age 0.01 VIQ 0.18 PIQ 0.18 Yes 0.5 Yes No
Williams et al. (2014) Yes Age 0.07 VIQ 0.21 PIQ 0.25 Yes 0.03 Yes No
Altgassen and Koch (2014) Partly Age 0.03 – NVA 0.1 No 0.94 Not reported No
Henry et al. (2014) Yes Age 0.07 VIQ 0.28 PIQ 0.24 NA – No Yes
Kretschmer et al. (2014) Yes Age: 0.45 VA 0.25 NVA 0.03 NA – No Yes
Yi et al. (2014) No
(ASD vs.  NTMA)
Age 1.29 VA 0.13 NVA 0.63 Not reported – Not reported No
No
(ASD vs.  NTCA)
Age 0.01 – NVA 0.65 Not reported – Not reported No
Sheppard et al. (2016) No
(ASDsevere vs. NT)
Age 3.05 R 0.15
W 0.64
N 0.16 NA – Not reported No
No
(ASDmild vs. NT)
Age 2.76 R 0.33
W 0.07
N 0.46 NA – Not reported No
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time-based) interaction effect on PM task performance, 
reflecting preserved event-based PM performance but 
impaired time-based PM in the ASD group. More adap-
tive time monitoring (i.e. a greater number of fuel checks 
prior to the period where refuelling was possible) was 
related to fewer time-based PM failures in both groups. 
Importantly, groups did not differ in ongoing task perfor-
mance, nor time-monitoring frequency or pattern.
The results of Williams et  al. (2013) were replicated 
precisely in a subsequent study by Williams et al. (2014) 
of 17 adults with ASD and 17 age-, and verbal and per-
formance IQ-matched NT adults. The same ongoing task 
(which tapped verbal short-term memory) was used for 
both PM conditions, which were carried out separately in 
counter-balanced order. In the ongoing task, participants 
studied sequences of seven words across 40 trials. After 
each study trial, a test list of seven words appeared on-
screen and participants had to decide whether all seven 
had been present on the immediately-preceding study list. 
The event-based PM instruction required participants to 
press a specific key when one of the test list words repre-
sented a musical instrument. For the time-based PM task, 
participants had to press a specific key every two minutes 
throughout the ongoing task. Participants could bring up 
a clock displaying the elapsed time via key press. Wil-
liams et al. (2014) found a significant Group × Condition 
interaction, reflecting diminished time-based but spared 
event-based PM performance in the ASD group. Again, 
groups did not differ in ongoing task performance or 
time-monitoring frequency.
In summary, there seems to be a consistent pattern 
emerging from these initial studies suggesting that time-
based PM is impaired, but event-based PM is unimpaired, 
in ASD. To explore this pattern further we first review 
four additional studies, which have investigated event-
based PM separately from time-based PM, followed by a 
review of more naturalistic studies of time- and/or event-
based PM.
Is ASD Characterised by Truly Unimpaired 
Event-Based PM?
Firstly, Yi et al. (2014) studied the role of executive func-
tioning in event-based PM in a sample of 25 children with 
ASD and two NT comparison groups. One comparison 
group was reported to be matched with the ASD group for 
chronological age  (NTCA, n = 25), whereas the other com-
parison group was reported to be matched with the ASD 
group for verbal mental age and nonverbal IQ,  (NTMA, 
n = 28). In Yi et al.’s paradigm, the ongoing task involved 
naming pictorial items on a series of cards. The PM task 
was to hand the experimenter a “target” card that had a 
red heart-shaped sticker on it. The ASD group performed 
significantly worse than both comparison groups on the PM 
task. Although this is an interesting study, there are two 
potential methodological issues with Yi et  al.’s procedure 
that might lead to caution when interpreting the results. 
Firstly, ongoing task performance was not reported and 
memory for the PM task instruction was not checked. It 
is not clear whether participants with ASD either noticed 
the target sticker on the relevant cards or even that they 
encoded the instruction to hand the cards with such a 
sticker to the experimenter. Secondly, based on the data 
provided, we believe that the groups were not equated 
on baseline cognitive abilities. The  NTCA group was not 
equated for verbal mental age or nonverbal IQ, whereas the 
 NTMA group was not matched on nonverbal IQ or chrono-
logical age. Although the authors stated that the  NTMA 
group was matched with the ASD group for nonverbal IQ 
this was not accurate. Rather, the groups were matched for 
raw scores on the Combined Raven’s Matrices test of non-
verbal ability, but not for the standardised scores (i.e., not 
for nonverbal IQ). Crucially, the standardised score among 
ASD participants was an average of 11 or 12 points below 
that of the comparison groups and was in the “below aver-
age” range (M = 79.17; SD = 21.83). In general, it is not 
clear why Yi et al. adopted this matching strategy. Ideally, 
case and control groups are matched for age and IQ, as 
other studies have shown is possible when investigating PM 
in ASD (see Williams et al. 2014).
The second such study also examined solely event-based 
PM in a similar age group. Brandimonte et al. (2011) stud-
ied event-based PM and response inhibition among 30 pri-
mary school-aged children with ASD, as well as 30 age, and 
full-scale IQ-matched and NT comparison participants. All 
participants completed a computerised ongoing task that 
involved sorting pictorial items into one of two categories 
(food and animals) via key press. The participants of each 
experimental group (n = 30 per group) were assigned to one 
of three between-subject conditions of the ongoing task. In 
a “PM condition”, n = 10 ASD and n = 10 NT participants 
completed the ongoing task as described, but had the addi-
tional requirement to press a particular keyboard key when-
ever pre-specified images appeared. In other words, par-
ticipants had to encode and retain a PM instruction while 
completing the ongoing categorisation task (hence, this 
was a standard PM task). In a “response inhibition” con-
dition, n = 10 ASD and n = 10 NT participants completed 
the ongoing task, but had the additional requirement to not 
respond (i.e., not make a categorisation judgement) when 
pre-specified images appeared. The requirements of this 
condition resemble a classic “Go/No-Go” task (Verbruggen 
and Logan 2008). Finally, in an “ongoing-only” condi-
tion, n = 10 ASD and n = 10 NT participants completed the 
ongoing task as described, but with no additional second-
ary requirements. This ongoing-only condition could be 
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considered a control condition to establish how able partic-
ipants with ASD are to perform the ongoing task independ-
ent of their PM or response inhibition skills. Brandimonte 
et al. (2011) performed two ANOVAs on their data. First, a 
2 (Group: ASD/NT) × 3 (Condition: ongoing/PM/response 
inhibition condition) was conducted with ongoing task 
accuracy (percentage of correctly categorised images) as 
the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect 
of group, indicating that the comparison groups performed 
better than the ASD groups (휂2
p
 = 0.07, p = .05) in the image 
categorisation task.
Second, a 2 (Group: ASD/NT) × 2 (Condition: PM/
response inhibition) ANOVA was conducted using second-
ary task accuracy (percentage of PM successes/percentage 
of responses correctly inhibited) as the dependent vari-
able. In this ANOVA, there was a significant main effect 
of group (휂2
p
 = 0.10, p < .05) indicating better performance 
in both secondary tasks (PM and response inhibition) in 
the comparison group than in the ASD group. Crucially, 
the Group × Condition interaction was reported as non-
significant and associated with a negligible effect size 
(휂2
p
 = 0.02, p = not reported). Despite the minimal interac-
tion effect, Brandimonte et  al. (2011) nonetheless broke 
it down using planned comparisons. These comparisons 
suggested that the ASD group was less accurate (휂2
p
 = 0.11, 
p < .05) and responded slower (휂2
p
 = 0.42, p < .01) than the 
NT group only in the PM task, whereas no between-group 
differences were evident in the Go/No-Go task (no effect 
sizes reported). Therefore, the authors concluded that indi-
viduals with ASD have a deficit in event-based PM, but are 
less affected in their response inhibition. However, there 
are some methodological issues that need to be addressed. 
First, breaking down non-significant interaction effects is 
problematic both statistically and conceptually, and may 
lead to erroneous conclusions being drawn (see Gelman 
and Stern 2006). Second, groups were clearly not equated 
for ongoing task performance and the difficulties with this 
aspect of the experiment for participants with ASD could 
account for their difficulties with the secondary tasks (i.e., 
PM and response inhibition). Finally, although Brandi-
monte et al. (2011) matched the participant groups for age 
and FSIQ overall, it is not clear that this was the case for 
each of the between-subjects experimental conditions (i.e. 
PM, inhibitory control and the ongoing-task-only condi-
tions). It is quite possible (but not reported in the paper) 
that diagnostic groups for each between-group condition 
were not comparable on these baseline variables, which 
could have generated artificial group differences in PM 
performance.
Third and most recently, Sheppard et al. (2016) investi-
gated the effect of autism symptom severity on event-based 
PM in 28 children with ASD and 26 NT controls. Sever-
ity of autism symptoms in the ASD group was assessed 
with the Child Autism Rating Scale (Schopler et al. 1980). 
Scores were used to divide the ASD sample into “severe 
ASD” and “mild ASD” groups (n = 14 each). In a game-like 
procedure participants interacted with a hand-puppet wolf 
(Wally, acted out by the experimenter) playing a distractor 
task game alternating with the completion of three differ-
ent PM tasks, and a retrospective memory task. Thus, there 
was no ongoing task as such. The PM tasks required the 
child to remember to (a) clap when they heard music being 
played (two trials, PM clapping task); (b) remove a toy food 
item out of Wally’s view because he could not eat them 
(two trials, PM feeding task); and (c) collect their reward at 
the end of the session (signalled by the experimenter saying 
“The games are now finished, time to go back to class.”) 
(PM reward task). For the PM clapping and the PM reward 
tasks, participants were prompted once at the end of each 
trial if they did not spontaneously remember the PM activ-
ity (children were asked: “Can you hear the music?” for the 
PM clapping task, and “Have you forgotten anything?” for 
the PM reward task). Collapsed across all three PM tasks, 
a significant main effect of group (휂2
p
 = 0.13) was found. 
Post-hoc tests revealed that this was driven by the signifi-
cant difference between the severe ASD and the NT group 
(d = 1.39). When examining the results separately, a similar 
pattern was found for the PM feeding task (휂2
p
 = 0.14). Fur-
ther, although there were no group differences on the first 
trial of the PM clapping task (similar performance without 
prompting, as well as similar performance improvement for 
all groups after being prompted), both ASD groups per-
formed significantly worse than the NT group (who signifi-
cantly improved their performance from the first to the sec-
ond unprompted trial) on the second unprompted trial. No 
significant group differences emerged for the PM reward 
task. The authors concluded that severely autistic children 
can succeed on certain event-based PM tasks if task char-
acteristics are adjusted to their needs (i.e., rewarding cir-
cumstances, specific PM cues). Further they suggested that, 
although children with ASD benefitted from prompts in 
the individual trials of the PM clapping task, this did not 
positively affect their performance from trial 1 to 2 in con-
trast to the NT group. The authors suggested this could be 
explained by information processing deficits in ASD when 
the ability to connect and integrate information across tasks 
is required (Olu-Lafe et al. 2014).
Although Sheppard et  al.’s (2016) study is interest-
ing, it suffers from a major methodological issue in terms 
of matching procedure. Groups were not matched for age 
or gender, and no standardised measure was employed to 
equate groups for cognitive ability. Instead groups were 
matched only for national curriculum point scores for read-
ing, writing, and number skills. The authors argue that “the 
demands of standard IQ tests such as WASI (Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Wechsler 1999) or 
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even BPVS (British Picture Vocabulary Test, Dunn et  al. 
2009) make this type of matching unsuitable for children 
with severe ASD” (pp.  6–7). However, it is counterintui-
tive that, if a child is not capable–because of their severe 
social-communication deficits–of completing standard IQ 
tests, they could complete an experimental task as complex 
as the task(s) used in this study (some of which were inher-
ently social).
Fourth and finally, Altgassen and Koch (2014) studied 
the contribution of inhibitory control demands on event-
based PM performance in 22 adults with ASD and 22 age- 
and nonverbal ability-matched NT adults. For this purpose, 
they used a triple task within-subject design. Participants 
completed two experimental conditions in counter-bal-
anced order. The ongoing task involved a word categori-
sation paradigm (deciding which of two words belongs to 
the same category as a third word). The colour of all three 
words changed randomly every trial. The PM instruction 
was to press a pre-specified key whenever all three words 
were printed in blue font. Simultaneously, inhibitory load 
was manipulated using an auditory mental arithmetic task. 
In a “low inhibitory load” condition, participants were pre-
sented with a sequence of numbers via headphones and 
were required to add five to each number and state the 
resulting sum. In a “high inhibitory load” condition, the 
procedure was the same but participants had to withhold 
saying the sum aloud when it equalled 8 or 15. Contrary to 
the hypothesis of the authors, there were no between-group 
differences in PM in either condition (i.e., regardless of 
inhibitory load), or in the extent to which responses were 
correctly withheld in the high-inhibitory control condition. 
These findings are striking and suggest that event-based 
PM is not impaired in ASD even when demands on execu-
tive resources associated with successful performance are 
high. However, in both inhibitory load conditions, perfor-
mance on the ongoing categorisation task itself was signifi-
cantly superior in the comparison group than in the ASD 
group (휂2
p
 = 0.18). As such, it remains a possibility that par-
ticipants with ASD were allocating relatively more of their 
cognitive resources to completion of the PM task and the 
ongoing inhibition task than were comparison participants. 
Therefore, it may be that participants with ASD were using 
alternative, compensatory strategies to succeed on the PM 
component of the task at the expense of performance on 
the ongoing activity. Problems with multimodal integra-
tion (Baum et al. 2015) in this particular triple-task design 
might have led individuals with ASD to focus more on one 
of the three tasks. That is, it might be that when attentional 
demands of the environment are high, people with ASD 
may need to prioritise carrying out the planned PM action 
at the expense of other activities to an extent that NT indi-
viduals do not. Either way, the fact that participants with 
ASD in Altgassen and Koch’s study performed comparably 
to NT individuals on a PM task that had very high execu-
tive demands suggests that this ability cannot be grossly 
impaired in adults with this disorder.
Overall, with the exception of study of Altgassen and 
Koch (2014), the studies discussed above, suggest that 
event-based PM is impaired in ASD contrary to the initial 
landmark studies reviewed. However, based on the criti-
cal analysis of the studies’ methodology, such a conclusion 
should be drawn tentatively at best. Below we will discuss 
a final set of studies exploring PM in ASD in more natural-
istic settings.
“Real-Life/Naturalistic” Studies of Time- 
and Event-Based PM
To explore both time- and event-based PM in a naturalistic 
setting Altgassen et  al. (2012) tested 25 adults with ASD 
and 25 NT participants matched for chronological age and 
intellectual abilities. The ongoing task consisted of pre-
paring breakfast (using props) for four people following 
a simple set of rules. Two time-based (taking the tea bag 
out of the tea after 3 min; putting butter on the table 6 min 
before guests arrive) and two event-based (preparing tea 
immediately after kettle went off, which was indicated by 
the kettle changing colour; turning off the egg cooker when 
it beeped) PM components were embedded the breakfast 
preparation routine. The aim of this complex paradigm was 
to mirror real life PM demands. In addition, participants 
also completed a standard measure of event-based PM (Red 
Pencil Test; Salthouse et  al. 2004), in which participants 
were asked to repeat the words ‘red pencil’ whenever the 
experimenter said ‘red pencil’ throughout the experimen-
tal session (which happened twice). Based on previous 
research, the authors predicted that only time-based PM 
would be diminished in the ASD group. In fact, however, 
participants with ASD showed diminished performance 
(i.e., more failures to complete the PM action) across all 
PM tasks. In relation to the time-based PM components of 
the breakfast task, the ASD group also monitored the time 
less often than the NT group.
The authors concluded that all aspects of PM ability are 
impaired under real‑life conditions in individuals with ASD. 
Although this conclusion may well be accurate, whether or 
not we can be certain of this from the data in this study is 
debateable. As the study required participants to carry out 
both time- and event-based PM tasks within the same ongo-
ing task (breakfast preparation), difficulties with time-based 
PM could have potentially carried over to the event-based 
PM performance in the ASD group. Thus, it may well be 
that ASD participants might not have been impaired in 
event-based PM in a real-life setting if they were not simul-
taneously having to carry out time-based PM. Moreover, the 
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ongoing task itself appeared to be significantly more chal-
lenging for the ASD group than for the comparison group, 
as indicated by significantly worse overall ongoing task 
completion, as well as significantly less rule adherence and 
less efficient performance throughout the experiment among 
ASD participants. Finally, it is highly problematic that 
memory for the PM instruction was not checked after task 
completion. This is crucial, because there was a minimum 
delay of 15 min between encoding the PM instruction and 
the beginning of the experimental task, which might have 
promoted forgetting of the task rules.
Two other studies aimed to explore PM in ASD in a more 
“real-life” setting. Both used the Virtual Week paradigm 
(see Rendell and Henry 2009 for full details of the para-
digm). The Virtual Week is a computerised single player 
board game that simulates 5–7 days of a week. Depending 
on the version of the task, the day and time of the virtual 
day are either always visible, or appear only after a particu-
lar keyboard key is pressed by the participant. The player 
rolls a die and moves a token around a board of 121 squares 
that represents one virtual day. On each virtual day, the 
player will pass ten squares, which require them to pick up 
an action card. Each action card poses a question about an 
activity for that time of the day that the participant has to 
make a decision about (e.g., choosing between three options 
for that day’s breakfast). Importantly, each choice deter-
mines whether the player has to roll a specific, an odd, or 
any number with their die on their next move to be allowed 
to continue moving their token around the board (which is 
revealed to them after selecting an activity option). Partici-
pants are unable to move on and have to repeat rolling the 
die until they have rolled the specific die number required. 
Hence the demands of rolling the die, moving the token 
around the board and making decisions about the activi-
ties to participate in, serve as the ongoing activity. Due to 
this board game nature of the task, the Virtual Week does 
not provide a measure of ongoing task performance per se, 
unlike more laboratory PM tasks. Additionally, each day, a 
total of four time- and four event-based PM tasks have to 
be carried out, in addition to the ten activity-related deci-
sions that are inherent to the game. The event-based PM 
tasks have to be carried when a particular event occurs (as 
indicated by the action cards; e.g., take medication at break-
fast would be triggered by the breakfast card). The time-
based PM tasks have to be carried out at a set time of the 
virtual day (e.g., phone the plumber at 5  pm). Some PM 
tasks require execution on a regular basis whereas others are 
irregular. The regular ones are the same on each day of the 
Virtual Week (two time-based, two event-based). The irreg-
ular ones are one-off tasks that are instructed at the begin-
ning of, or during, a new virtual day (two time-based, two 
event-based). Thus, the retrospective memory load for the 
irregular PM tasks is higher compared to the regular ones. 
At the appropriate moment to execute a PM task, the par-
ticipant has to press a “perform task” button to bring up a 
list of possible tasks, and then choose the correct one.
One of the two studies which have used this Virtual 
Week paradigm with individuals with ASD was that of 
Henry et  al. (2014). This study explored how differen-
tial levels of task absorption (i.e., the level of engagement 
in the ongoing task) affected PM in 30 children with ASD 
and 30 NT children matched for age and IQ. Tasks in the 
Virtual Week were adjusted to reflect children’s everyday 
life. Further, to reduce/eliminate time-monitoring demands, 
the time of each virtual day was always present in the cen-
tre of the screen. Participants completed the Virtual Week 
game under two conditions (each lasting three virtual days) 
in counterbalanced order. In the high task absorption con-
dition, participants could only continue moving their token 
around the board if they rolled a specific number after an 
event card (see description above), whereas in the low 
absorption condition, the outcome of the next die roll was 
not restricted. The authors predicted that high task absorp-
tion may lead to greater PM impairment in the ASD group. 
A 2 (Group: ASD/NT) × 2 (Task absorption: low/high) × 2 
(Type of PM task: event-based/time-based) × 2 (Regularity: 
regular/irregular) mixed ANOVA was conducted to explore 
effects on PM performance. Most importantly, a significant 
Group × PM task interaction (휂2
p
 = 0.21) was found indicat-
ing that the ASD group was only impaired in time-based but 
not event-based PM, which ties in with the consistent pat-
tern found by the landmark (tightly controlled) studies sum-
marised above. Contrary to author predictions, high task 
absorption did not affect the ASD group to a greater extent. 
Further, the Group × Regularity interaction approached sig-
nificance (p = .06, 휂2
p
 = 0.06). The authors broke this margin-
ally non-significant interaction down using post-hoc t-tests. 
These t tests showed no performance difference between 
regular and irregular PM tasks within the ASD group 
(휂2
p
 = 0.02), whereas NT individuals performed slightly bet-
ter on regular PM tasks (p = .04, 휂2
p
 = 0.07). However, in 
comparison to the NT group, participants with ASD were 
still less accurate on both regular (휂2
p
 = 0.21) and irregular 
(휂2
p
 = 0.16) PM tasks. Therefore, authors concluded that PM 
difficulties in children with ASD are not a result of retro-
spective memory processes. Instead, they suggested that a 
monitoring deficit might underlie their PM deficits as time-
based PM requires more self-initiated monitoring processes.
Another study which used the Virtual Week set-up 
was that of Kretschmer et  al. (2014). Rather than focus-
ing on the degree of absorption (which presumably affects 
retrieval of the original intention to carry out an action), 
Kretschmer et al. (2014) used this paradigm to investigate 
the effects of different encoding strategies on PM in a sam-
ple of 27 adults with ASD and 27 NT adults matched for 
age, verbal, and non-verbal abilities. The Virtual Week 
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setup and tasks were as described above, but participants 
had to complete only three virtual days, and needed to press 
a specific keyboard key to display the time of the day. PM 
encoding was compared across two between-subject condi-
tions, the first being a ‘standard’ condition and the second 
requiring implementation intentions, which is an encoding 
strategy that requires to form ‘if-then’ statements; that is, 
creating a specific situation when, where, and how to per-
form one’s intention (Gollwitzer 1999). Implementation 
intentions have been shown to improve PM in NT stud-
ies (Chen et al. 2015) and are thought to support episodic 
future thinking (Atance and O’Neill 2001). Hence, this 
was the first study exploring strategies to enhance PM in 
ASD. Specifically, in the implementation intention condi-
tion, participants had to form such an ‘if-then’ statement 
for each irregular PM task instruction of that day after the 
instructions had been presented on-screen (e.g., say out-
loud, “when it is 5 p.m., then I will press the ‘perform task’ 
button and select ‘phone the plumber’”; Kretschmer et al. 
(2014), p.  3112). The logic here was that forcing partici-
pants with ASD to form implementation intentions would 
support their PM and, thus, raise their performance level 
to one commensurate with that among NT participants. 
No additional instructions were given in the standard con-
dition. To analyse experimental task performance, the 
authors ran a 2 (Group: ASD/NT) × 2 (Encoding condition: 
standard/implementation intention) × 2 (Type of PM task: 
event-based/time-based) × 2 (Regularity: regular/irregular) 
mixed ANOVA to analyse PM performance across all three 
virtual days. They found a main effect of group (휂2
p
 = 0.14), 
as well as a significant Group x Regularity (휂2
p
 = 0.12) 
interaction. Interestingly, post-hoc test results revealed 
no within-group differences for NT adults, but ASD par-
ticipants performed better on regular than irregular PM 
tasks (휂2
p
 = 0.17). Because no Group × PM task interaction 
emerged, the authors concluded that individuals with ASD 
have a general deficit across both time- and event-based 
PM. The Group × Encoding condition interaction was non-




 = 0.06). Nonetheless, the authors broke down the interac-
tion effect. Post-hoc between-participant tests revealed that, 
relative to comparison participants, individuals with ASD 
showed diminished performance in the standard condition 
only; whereas in the implementation intentions condition, 
the between-group differences in performance were non-
significant. Based on these results, the authors concluded 
that implementation intentions might present a strategy to 
support PM in individuals with ASD. However, a closer 
inspection of the results suggests that this conclusion is not 
entirely warranted. Kretschmer (personal communication, 
October 2016) provided the group means and SDs, which 
indicated that the ASD group only benefitted from employ-
ing implementation intentions for event-based PM [ASD: 
 MImplementationIntentions = 0.81 (SD = 0.22),  MStandard = 0.62 
(SD = 0.33); TD:  MImplementationIntentions = 0.84 (SD = 0.22), 
 MStandard = 0.80 (SD = 0.29)]. However, rather than imple-
mentation intentions improving time-based PM perfor-
mance of ASD, they instead decreased the performance 
of comparison participants (relative to the standard con-
dition performance) [ASD:  MImplementationIntentions = 0.53 
(SD = 0.32),  MStandard = 0.49 (SD = 0.32); TD: 
 MImplementationIntentions = 0.58 (SD = 0.25),  MStandard = 0.79 
(SD = 0.24)]. Further, in contrast to Henry et al. (2014), the 
authors concluded that retrospective memory demands are 
important to understand PM deficits in ASD as participants 
only showed significant impairments in the irregular (one-
off non-routine) PM tasks (p < .001, 휂2
p
 = 0.27), which place 
particularly high demands on retrospective memory. Unfor-
tunately, the authors could not check whether participants 
actually remembered the irregular PM task instructions 
after each virtual day; although participants had to repeat 
the PM instruction three times aloud at the stage of encod-
ing (which was supposed to ensure later remembering), 
there is no way of knowing whether the instruction was 
stored for the duration of the Virtual Week task. As such, 
retrospective memory limitations in ASD might explain 
entirely the group difference in the number of times irregu-
lar PM tasks were completed.
The Virtual Week is an interesting approach to study 
PM in ASD. The game format makes it easily accessible 
and it attempts to mirror everyday PM demands in sev-
eral respects. However, the PM demands of the task are 
arguably much greater than (and of a different quality to) 
those in real life; participants have to remember 24 PM 
tasks (requiring the execution of both time- and event-
based tasks and changing retrospective memory load) 
during a short period of time and without the use of any 
external reminders. Further, in the version used for both 
studies on ASD, the Virtual Week version did not offer 
the possibility to check whether participants actually 
remembered their PM tasks for each virtual day, which 
would have been particularly important for irregular PM 
tasks. However, Henry et al. (2014) pointed out that this 
feature is now part of the newest version of Virtual Week.
The results of the two studies that employed the Vir-
tual Week paradigm differ in one major respect. Henry 
et al. (2014) found only time-based PM to be diminished 
in children with ASD, which is in line Williams et  al.’s 
findings (2013, 2014). In contrast, Kretschmer et al. (2014) 
observed impairments of both time- and event-based PM 
in adults. This is surprising and requires further explora-
tion. Kretschmer et  al. (2014) employed a version of the 
Virtual Week that was equivalent to Henry et al.’s (2014) 
high-absorption condition. A possible explanation for the 
differing pattern of results could be the aforementioned 
retrospective memory difficulties in the ASD group. 
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Kretschmer et  al. (2014) found that the ASD group per-
formed worse on the irregular PM tasks that posed the 
highest retrospective memory demand. This result may 
reflect the viable possibility that participants with ASD 
simply forgot the PM instruction more frequently. In gen-
eral, the possibility that event-based PM deficits in ASD 
are observed only when demands on retrospective memory 
are high is brought into focus by the findings from a very 
large study of “everyday memory” by Jones et al. (2011).
Jones et al. (2011) investigated everyday memory in 94 
adolescents with ASD and 55 age-, and IQ- (verbal, per-
formance, and full scale) matched NT peers. Jones et al. 
used the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson 
and Baddeley 1991) to assess everyday memory across 
multiple subtests, three of which tested event-based PM. 
These sub-tests involved (a) reminding the experimenter 
about the location of a pen upon the occurrence of a par-
ticular verbal cue; (b) asking the experimenter a question 
when an alarm went off; and (c) remembering to pick 
up an envelope before walking a route as demonstrated 
by the experimenter. The ASD group achieved a signifi-
cantly lower PM composite score (across the three sub-
tests) than the comparison group, indicating significant 
event-based PM impairments in this very large sample of 
ASD participants. However, Williams et al. (2013) noted 
that Jones et al.’s analysis included participants who had 
failed to remember the PM task instruction at all. When 
the data from Jones et al. (2011) were re-analysed exclud-
ing participants who completely failed to recall the PM 
instruction, there was no hint of any between-group dif-
ferences in PM task performance (Williams et  al. 2013, 
p.  1564). This re-analysis underscores the importance 
of controlling for retrospective memory demands when 
drawing conclusions about PM ability in ASD.
Discussion
Why is Time-Based PM Impaired in ASD?
The evidence from the meta-analysis presented in Part 1, as 
well as our review of the evidence in Part  2, suggest 
strongly that time-based PM in ASD is impaired. Of course, 
the challenge remains to explore the underlying reasons for 
this impairment. Several studies have explored the underly-
ing cognitive correlates of time-based PM in ASD (see 
Table 4).2 Although these correlation analyses offer some 
indication about the underlying cause of time-based PM 
2 Table  4 also outlines the cognitive correlates of event-based PM. 
However, given that a number of the studies included had methodo-
logical drawbacks, even where significant relationships with potential 
cognitive underpinnings were found, these need to be interpreted with 
caution.
impairments in ASD, they are far from conclusive. In gen-
eral, time-based PM performance appears to be related to 
executive functioning processes in ASD. Given that time-
based PM requires self-initiated (rather than cued) retrieval 
of intentions, it is unsurprising that executive processes 
might be related to task performance, since self-initiated 
retrieval of information from memory is considered to 
place a high demand on executive functioning (e.g. McDan-
iel and Einstein 2007). It may be, therefore, that well-estab-
lished difficulties with aspects of executive functioning in 
ASD underpin time-based PM deficits in ASD.
An alternative possibility is that difficulties with repre-
senting mental states (i.e. theory of mind) in ASD make 
it particularly difficult for people with ASD to introspect/
retrieve their own intentions (e.g., Williams and Happé 
2010). Given the link between PM and theory of mind in 
NT individuals (e.g. Ford et  al. 2012), this could explain 
time-based PM deficits in ASD. Indeed, the association 
found by Williams et  al. (2013) between time-based PM 
and theory of mind supports this possibility. The idea is 
that theory of mind is relevant for mental self-projection, 
i.e. the ability to shift one’s perspective from the immedi-
ate present to alternative perspectives (Buckner and Carroll 
2007), which overlaps with episodic future thinking pro-
cesses. Hence NT individuals might not only think more 
frequently about their delayed intentions but also, if they 
do, mentally simulate their execution, strengthening rel-
evant context associations for later PM retrieval. Therefore, 
if individuals with ASD have difficulties with theory of 
mind and with generating future episodic representations as 
a result of diminished self-projection ability (see Lind et al. 
2014, for relevant evidence), this would be expected to con-
tribute to poor time-based PM performance (see Williams 
et al. 2013, for a discussion of this possibility).
One final possibility to consider is that time-based PM 
deficits in ASD may result from difficulties with time per-
ception (see Allman and Meck 2012). However, neither 
time-estimation (Shah et  al. 2016) nor reproduction (Wal-
lace and Happé 2008) of time units broadly similar to those 
involved in time-based PM tasks (up to 49  s) appear to be 
impaired in ASD. Data from studies of time-based PM 
are also informative. In five out of the aforementioned six 
studies of time-based PM, participants had to monitor the 
elapsed time during the experiment (by pressing a keyboard 
key to bring up a clock), which depends on time perception. 
Two of these studies did not find any indication of between-
group differences in time monitoring despite finding sig-
nificant time-based PM impairments (Williams et al. 2013, 
2014), whereas two reported significantly fewer clock-checks 
in ASD (Altgassen et al. 2009, 2012). However, in the stud-
ies by Altgassen et al. memory for task instructions was not 
assessed, meaning that between-group differences in time-
monitoring might be attributable to a failure to recall that 
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the time even needed to be checked. Overall, the existing 
evidence regarding time perception in ASD does not provide 
strong support for the hypothesis that impaired time monitor-
ing is the major cause of time-based PM problems in ASD, 
although future research should consider this explicitly.
Taken together, it is clear that there are multiple poten-
tial causes of the evident time-based PM impairment in 
ASD. Although studies of the cognitive correlates of this 
impairment are potentially informative, Table 4 illustrates 
the “patchwork” nature of results, as well as the fact that 
almost no correlate has been studied systematically across 
studies. Future studies might consider focussing on the key 
candidate underlying causes of this PM impairment and 
conduct systematic investigations of those.
Is Event-Based PM Really Impaired in ASD?
Although the conclusions drawn in parts 1 and 2 of this 
paper were remarkably consistent in suggesting a large 
impairment of time-based PM in ASD, this consistency 
was not evident with regard to event-based PM. Although 
the meta-analysis presented in Part 1 provided evidence of 
a subtle (statistically small) impairment of event-based PM 
in ASD, the review presented in Part 2 questions the valid-
ity of the evidence from the meta-analysis. Eleven studies 
have investigated event-based PM among individuals with 
ASD. Five of the studies found an impairment in ASD, 
while six did not. There is no clear pattern with regard to 
age; half of the studies found an impairment in their adult/
children samples while the other half did not. However, if 
one only considers the studies that fulfilled the aforemen-
tioned methodological guidelines necessary for studying 
PM in ASD, evidence points toward unimpaired event-
based PM in ASD.
A careful consideration of the studies of event-based 
PM that were included in the meta-analysis suggest that 
the methodological rigour of several of the studies was not 
sufficiently high to draw strong conclusions from the meta-
analytic data. That is, although the results from across all 
studies of event-based PM in ASD suggest a subtle impair-
ment in ASD, the methods that produced those results may 
not be valid and/or reliable enough to allow a firm conclu-
sion from the results to be drawn. There are also a priori 
reasons to hypothesise that event-based PM should be unim-
paired (despite impaired time-based PM) in ASD. The pro-
file of strengths and weaknesses in retrospective memory in 
ASD suggests that this ability is impaired only when tests of 
memory are uncued/unstructured (see Boucher et al. 2012). 
For example, in tests of free recall, which require self‑initi‑
ated retrieval of information from long-term memory (par-
alleling the demands of time-based PM), adults and chil-
dren with ASD tend to show diminished performance. In 
contrast, in tests of cued recall or recognition (where a cue/
the context for retrieval is provided, paralleling the demands 
of event-based PM), adults and children with ASD tend to 
show undiminished performance. These findings have led to 
suggestions that only unstructured/unsupported cognitive/
memory tasks will be impaired in ASD (the “task support 
hypothesis”; e.g., Bowler et al. 2004). Our analysis in Part 2 
of this paper is in line with this hypothesis.
Future Directions
PM impairments can seriously impact an individual’s eve-
ryday life and independent functioning. This review indi-
cates that time-based PM is challenging for individuals 
with ASD, which is consistent with self-reports (Williams 
et al. 2014). Event-based PM problems might also represent 
a challenge for people with ASD in everyday life. However, 
this review indicates that evidence for an event-based PM 
impairment in ASD is mixed, at best. Methodological limi-
tations with several of the existing studies of event-based 
PM prevent firm conclusions about the extent to which this 
ability is impaired in ASD. Further, well-controlled stud-
ies need to investigate event-based PM systematically and 
taking into consideration the methodological guidelines 
outlined above.
In practice, PM impairments in ASD may result in 
reduced autonomy and greater dependency on carers, 
parents, or partners to support daily activities and time-
management. For instance, PM problems might lead to 
forgetting to pay their mobile phone bill, pick up a parcel 
from the post-office, or to attend a medical appointment 
(Blomqvist et al. 2015). Equally, PM impairments could 
negatively impact employment opportunities for indi-
viduals with ASD (employers might understandably per-
ceive a person with diminished PM as unreliable, because 
they forget to complete assignments, meet deadlines, or 
pass on important message), which may contribute to low 
rates of full-time employment among individuals with 
ASD (Howlin and Moss 2012).
Given the well-established, large diminution of time-
based PM in ASD, it will be important to develop training 
strategies to support/enhance this ability in order to pro-
mote greater functional independence. This requires to fill 
in the gaps in our understanding of how individuals with 
ASD engage in time-based prospective remembering. To 
this end, a systematic exploration of cognitive mecha-
nisms that underpin PM performance in ASD is neces-
sary. Conversely, finding strategies that may improve 
time-based PM could also reveal underlying causes of its 
impairment in ASD. If, for example, efforts to improve 
executive functioning (or episodic future thinking or 
theory of mind) were found to improve time-based PM 
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in individuals with ASD, this would suggest that execu-
tive dysfunction is a key contributory factor to dimin-
ished time-based PM in ASD. Another approach could be 
to test whether manipulations that lead to PM improve-
ment in older NT adults might have a similar beneficial 
effect in ASD (see Hering et al. 2014 for a review). For 
instance, using rewards to increase a person’s motivation 
has previously been shown to have positive effects on PM 
performance in NT samples (see Walter and Meier 2014 
for a review). However, causes for PM problems in ASD 
may not necessarily be the same as in healthy ageing. 
Hence, transfer of seemingly useful PM strategies (e.g. 
implementation intentions, active cue monitoring, time-
checking training, increasing motivation) in NT individu-
als may not lead to a reliable PM improvement in ASD. It 
seems clear that PM research in ASD is in its infancy, rel-
atively-speaking, and that there are as more unanswered 
questions than questions answered. This review provides 
suggestions and guidelines for future research, which we 
hope will be useful for clinicians and researchers alike 
when considering this ability in ASD.
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